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PATENTs-MsuSE DOCTRINE-EXCLUSIvE DISTRIBUTORSHIP AGREEMENTS AS

PATENT MIsUsE-In a suit for infringement of a storm window patent,

defendant claimed that relief should be denied because plaintiff allegedly
misused the suit patent by requiring its wholesale distributors to maintain sales organizations devoted exclusively to the sale of plaintiff's windows, and by restraining the distributors from offering merchandise for
sale in competition with any article manufactured or distributed by plaintiff. The patent did not comprise an element of the distributor agree-
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ments, but was mentioned therein. The trial court denied relief, sustaining the defense of misuse of the suit patent. On appeal, held, affirmed.
A patentee's right does not extend to use of his patent to purge the market
of competing non-patented goods by means of exclusive distributor agreements. The F. C. Russell Co. v. Consumers Insulation Co., (3d Cir. 1955)
226 F. (2d) 373.
The patent misuse doctrine' is based upon the equitable principle of
clean hands2 and the public policy of limiting the scope of patents to
the original grant. From its inception the misuse doctrine has been relied
upon virtually automatically by courts of equity to deny relief from infringement to a patentee who has been using the patent as a lever to
restrain competition beyond the limits granted by the patent itself.8 In
the typical misuse cases the unlawful demands of the patentee are exacted
in return for a license privilege, the patents being integral to the unlawful
activity. In the principal case the agreements were not licenses, but distributorship agreements, granting no privileges that were based directly
upon the patent. 4 The mention of the patent in the agreements was little
more than a statement of fact, bearing no greater practical impact upon
the distributor than did the display of the patent number on the patented
windows. There was no causal relationship between the patent and the
restrictive clauses in the agreements.5 This argument, however, failed
ISee Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 US. 502 (1917).
2
See Rich, "Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952," 21 GEo.
WAsH. L. REv. 521 at 525 (1953).
3 The "tying clause' cases established that a patent license may not be conditioned
on the licensee's promise to purchase solely from the patentee unpatented goods used
in practicing the patent. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., note 1
supra; Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27
(1931); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938); B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis,
314 U.S. 495 (1942); Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Mercoid
Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944). The doctrine was expanded
considerably in National Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garrett Co., (3d Cir. 1943) 137
F. (2d) 255. The court there condemned as unlawful attempts by the patentee to license
his patent only if the licensee promised to refrain from manufacturing competing unpatented goods. See also McCullough v. Kammerer Corp., (9th Cir. 1948) 166 F. (2d)
759, in which a strong dissent to this view was registered; Park-In Theatres v. ParamountRichards Theatres, (D.C. Del. 1950) 90 F. Supp. 730. Cf. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v.
United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912), which involved a prosecution under the Sherman Act.
The Court in that case stated that the added element of the patent could not confer
immunity from condemnation for restraining competitors and controlling prices.
4 The same privileges of selling that were granted to the distributors could also have
been granted if the storm windows were not patented.
5 The Report of the Attorney General's National Committee To Study Antitrust
Laws commented upon a previous case in which the Russell Company was plaintiff
under similar circumstances, F. C. Russell Co. v. Comfort Equipment Corp., (7th Cir.
1952) 194 F. (2d) 592, remarking that, "While the patent was mentioned in the recitals
of the agreements, there was nothing to indicate that it had any practical relationship
with the exclusive agreement or bearing on the enforcement of the patent. We believe
that the approach of this case confuses the conduct of the patentee in relation to the
patent and his conduct with reference to other matters.' REPORT OF THE Arro.NEa GENEAw's NATIONAL COMMrMM TO STuvy THE ANTRusT LAws 251 (1955). See also Oppenheim, "Patents and Antitrust: Peaceful Coexistence?" 54 Micu. L. REv. 199 at 213 (1955).
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to impress the court,8 which held that the utilization by a patentee of a
common commercial sales device, the exclusive distributorship, is unlawful because the distributed product is patented. This case expands the
misuse doctrine unreasonably, and establishes a double standard for the
judicial appraisal of commercial activity, viz., the patentee may not use
the exclusive distributorship to exploit his product, while the non-patentee
may.7 This double standard results from a failure of the court to examine
the agreement between the parties in its full commercial context.8 The
expanded doctrine confuses the patentee's lawful exploitation of a superior
bargaining position, which is the result of product popularity and commercial success,9 with patent misuse. In effect, the patent thus becomes a
practical and a legal obstacle to successful exploitation of the invention,
for the mere existence of a patent with an exclusive distributorship establishes a virtual presumption of misuse,1o with the result that the infringing
defendant is substantially relieved of the proof of causal relationship between the patent and the clause under attack. It is clear that this expansion of the misuse doctrine will add to the already appreciable burdens
and unwarranted limitations"l on the freedom of patentees to exploit their
inventions. This discrimination against patentees was probably never
intended by the Supreme Court when the misuse doctrine was adopted, for
the difficulties which this latest expansion of the misuse doctrine places
before the patentee seem more inimical to the public interest than the
very practice at which the rule was aimed.
Howard N. Nemerovski

Principal case at 376.
7 See Park-In Theatres v. Paramount Theatres, note 3 supra, at 733.
8

8 Cf. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERALs'S NATIONAL CoMNITTE

TO STUDY THE ANTI-

TRusT LAws 238 (1955).
9 Russell was the largest producer of windows in the highly competitive market.
It spent between $200,000 and $250,000 in advertising each year to sustain its position
of commercial leadership. Principal case at 374.
10 Principal case at 376.
u See discussion in H. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly
Power of the Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st sess., Ser. No. 14, Part 1,p. 430
(1949). But see Clapp, "Some Recent Development in Patent-Antitrust Law," 34 J.P.O.S.
945 (1952); Yankwich, "Competition, Real or Soft?" 14 F.R.D. 199 at 209 (1954).

